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Liquidity and Market Efficiency in the World’s Largest Carbon Market 
 
Abstract 
We investigate liquidity and market efficiency on the world’s largest carbon exchange, 
IntercontinentalExchange Inc.’s European Climate Exchange (ECX), by using intraday short-
horizon return predictability as an inverse indicator of market efficiency. We find a strong 
relationship between liquidity and market efficiency such that when spreads narrow, return 
predictability diminishes. This is more pronounced for the highest trading carbon futures and 
during periods of low liquidity. Since the start of trading in Phase II of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) prices have continuously moved nearer to unity with efficient, 
random walk benchmarks, and this improves from year to year. Overall, our findings suggest 
that trading quality in the EU-ETS has improved markedly and matures over the 2008-2011 
compliance years.  
 
JEL Classifications: G12, G13, G14, G15, G18 
 
Keywords: Liquidity; Order flow; Market efficiency; Return predictability; European Climate 
Exchange; EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS); Carbon futures 
 
1. Introduction 
The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) is both the largest compulsory cap and 
trade scheme in the world and the most potent regional climate change policy tool arising from 
the EU’s 2002 ratification of the Kyoto protocol, a global treaty on greenhouse gas emission 
reduction.1 The operation and success of the EU-ETS will significantly inform the direction of 
global climate policy, identifying effective mechanisms for carbon trading and the effect of 
different restrictions on the price of emissions.  The scheme may also affect the growth of the 
emission-constrained economies in Europe, New Zealand, the United States, Japan and other 
parts of the world. This is because regulatory arbitrage is likely to be greater when carbon 
trading is limited to significantly smaller geographical locations, as is the case at this time. The 
market is artificial and dependent on environmental policy and regulation; it is therefore 
exposed to greater levels of uncertainty than is the case for most ‘natural’ commodities.  
                                                            
1 At present there are at least 18 of such market-based schemes worldwide, and the EU-ETS is the largest of them 
all, driving more than 90% of all global transactions in carbon financial instruments (see Ibikunle et al., 2013).   
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Emissions permits have to be surrendered on an annual basis. In principle, therefore, futures 
contracts on emissions permits offer significant benefits, both as instruments for hedging price 
risk and as mechanisms to assist in the smooth operation of the system as a whole.  
Understanding the microstructure of these markets therefore goes a long way in helping to 
inform global climate change policy. This paper contributes to an understanding of the market 
microstructure for an emerging market that addresses the climate change challenge. 
Financial markets perform two key functions: the provision of liquidity, and price 
discovery (see O'Hara, 2003). The extent to which the price discovery process reflects all 
available information in the market can be described as an indication of the market’s efficiency 
(see Fama, 1970). In regular financial markets liquidity plays an important role in enhancing 
price discovery and by extension, pricing efficiency. In this paper we first test whether this 
holds for the EU-ETS, and thus determine that intraday pricing efficiency is inextricably linked 
to daily liquidity. Specifically, we confirm that the predictability of intraday returns from 
intraday lagged order flows significantly decreases on days when the market enjoys greater 
liquidity. Fama’s (1970) view of market efficiency implies the absence of return predictability, 
while market microstructure literature emphasises the reflection of private information in prices 
as a measure of market quality (see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2008). Kyle (1985) 
notes that even the most efficient of markets reflects different levels of private information. 
Naturally, when markets attain higher levels of liquidity due to an exogenous event they may 
more easily absorb private information, since increased liquidity may encourage more 
informed trading due to a fall in transaction costs (see Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988). The link 
between liquidity and pricing efficiency is even more important in the case of the EU-ETS, 
where EU policies are being implemented in order to increase transactions in carbon permits. 
Such policies can be regarded as exogenous events akin to policy regarding tick size changes 
on NYSE, for example. In this paper, where we identify the commencement of compliance 
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years as an exogenous event corresponding to the tightening of trading spreads (see Figure 2), 
a confirmation of the liquidity-return predictability link would imply that increased trading 
activity induced by EU policies could improve EU-ETS pricing efficiency. This is the first 
empirical study to directly examine the intraday evolution of this relationship in an 
environmental market like the EU-ETS. Secondly, we test whether market efficiency improves 
over the course of 40 months in Phase II of the EU-ETS, by using compliance years as 
exogenous regimes which correspond to reductions in trading spreads. The study thus presents 
the longest period study of intraday analysis of intraday pricing dynamics in the EU-ETS. 
Thirdly, we test whether intraday prices move closer to random walk benchmarks from 
compliance year to compliance year in Phase II. Deviations from a random walk benchmark 
would implicitly suggest higher levels of noise in the trading process, and vice versa. These 
three issues hold significance for several stakeholders. Firstly, policy makers who aim to 
improve trading activity as well as efficiency of the trading process may benefit from a clearer 
understanding of the links between return predictability and liquidity. Secondly, market makers 
on EU-ETS platforms, whose job it is to provide liquidity, platform operators and regulators 
may learn how the evolution of liquidity could affect the price discovery process. Thirdly, 
investors in carbon financial instruments may also find this study beneficial, as intraday prices 
rather than end of day prices mostly influence trader sentiment, and trades clustered around the 
opening/closing of the market (at which point it is most volatile – see  Rotfuß, 2009) may be 
the basis for settling derivative contracts.   
As market participants require time to incorporate new information into their trading 
strategies, a market deemed efficient over a daily horizon does not necessarily translate into a 
market that is efficient at every point during the day (see for example Fama, 1970, Epps, 1979, 
Hillmer and Yu, 1979, Patell and Wolfson, 1984, Chordia et al., 2008). Confirmation of this 
notion is available in the contributions of Cushing and Madhavan (2000) and Chordia, Roll, 
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and Subrahmanyam (2005), showing that short-run returns can be predicted from order flows. 
However, Chordia et al. (2008) find that this predictability diminishes with improving market 
liquidity and across different tick size regimes on the NYSE. Similarly, Chung and Hrazdil 
(2010a) confirm the diminishing predictability proposition in a large sample analysis of 
NASDAQ stocks. These studies thus provide evidence of a strong relationship between 
liquidity and the enhancement of market efficiency through the impact of liquidity on the 
pricing process.  
Another stream of literature examines the connection between liquidity and returns 
through the demand for premia when trading in illiquid instruments. Pástor and Stambaugh 
(2003) find a positive cross-sectional relationship between stock returns and liquidity risks. 
Their results are underscored by similar findings from Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998) and 
Acharya and Pederson (2005). Similarly, Amihud (2002) documents evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that expected market liquidity provides an indication of stock excess return in a 
time series. This implies that the excess return, to some extent, typifies an illiquidity premium. 
Chang, Faff, and Hwang (2010) also report consistent findings for the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
Chordia et al. (2008) make an insightful argument for the relatedness of pricing 
efficiency and liquidity. Consider market makers in a hypothetical market struggling to sustain 
liquidity supply. This may be as a result of financial difficulties or over-exposure to untenable 
positions. Market makers may be relatively sensitive to significant buy orders for example, or 
an imbalance between buy and sell orders may imply that trading is taking place on the basis 
of private information.  When such a scenario exists, pricing strain caused by arriving order 
flows potentially forces a brief deviation of prices from their underlying worth (hence 
inefficiency; see Fama, 1970). Order flow can thus give an indication of instrument returns, at 
least over short intervals (see also Stoll, 1978, Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004). 
Experienced and vigilant market participants (perhaps trading with algorithms for a significant 
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proportion of the time) are likely to notice at least some of these deviations from random walk 
benchmarks, and thus become informed. Participants who remain unaware of the deviations 
can therefore be regarded as uninformed within the scope of those price deviations. The 
informed traders may tender market orders with the aim of profiting from the arbitrage 
opportunity. This is an informed trading activity. The choice of market orders is informed by 
the need to quickly profit before the arbitrage opportunity disappears, which would most likely 
be fleeting. The submitted orders from the arbitrageurs, assuming they are made in sufficient 
volumes and on time, are the ones that would lead to reduced pressure on the market makers’ 
inventories. This then leads to the correction of the asset prices. According to Chordia et al. 
(2005), the correction in asset prices decreases return predictability. Since arbitrage traders 
(also known as informed traders - see Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) are more likely to tender 
orders when the spreads are narrow, one would expect reduced return predictability when the 
market is more liquid than otherwise (see for example Peterson and Sirri, 2002, Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998 for the influence of liquidity on trading strategies). We investigate this 
hypothesis in a unique market, the EU-ETS, created as a result of climate change policy.2 In a 
market like the EU-ETS, which is set up to enable firms whose emissions are constrained under 
EU law (compliance traders) to exchange emission permits, the activities of arbitrageurs 
demand examination. Suppose arbitrageurs enter the market in order to exploit price deviations 
from instruments’ underlying values. This may not enhance value for compliance traders, since 
such action may lead to failure of the scheme through the erosion of confidence. Even market 
makers, available in several EU-ETS platforms, may not consistently provide a sufficient level 
of liquidity throughout the trading day. However if, as proposed by the foregoing hypothesis, 
arbitrageurs’ activity enhance pricing efficiency, then ultimately compliance traders may 
                                                            
2 Our approach is clearly different from the spot-futures relationship approach usually adopted for measuring 
futures market efficiency (see for example Kellard, Newbold, Rayner, and Ennew, 1999). 
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benefit from trading in a market with a diversified pool of traders, including non-compliance 
informed traders. Nonetheless, it appears that the activities of informed traders are limited in 
the EU-ETS. Bredin, Hyde, and Muckley’s (2011) findings imply that liquidity traders 
dominate informed traders on the European Climate Exchange (ECX), the largest trading venue 
by volume in the EU-ETS. Thus informed trading activity might actually be limited enough to 
avoid impairing market integrity, but sufficient to enhance short run pricing efficiency as 
argued by Chordia et al. (2008). Several other papers also investigate informed trading in the 
EU-ETS (see as examples, Kalaitzoglou and Maher Ibrahim, 2013, Ibikunle, Gregoriou, and 
Pandit, 2013). Their findings suggest that informed trading activity in the EU-ETS is linked 
with improved market efficiency, as is the case in established markets.   
This study mainly employs the short horizon order imbalance and return predictability 
regressions methodology of Chordia et al. (2008) to examine the relationship between liquidity 
and market efficiency. Our main findings are as follows: (i) Intraday return predictability is 
significantly reduced when the traded instruments are relatively more liquid, hence short 
horizon pricing is closely linked with liquidity – daily liquidity robustness tests and causality 
analyses also support this conclusion; (ii) Short run instrument trading return predictability is 
reduced as the market evolves/matures over a 40-month period, this indicates that pricing 
efficiency is enhanced progressively over the same period; (iii) The ECX instruments tested 
show improvement in terms of conformity with random walk benchmarks with each successive 
compliance period, thus implying a progressive reduction in noise trading. Overall, the findings 
suggest that the ECX has achieved a comparable level of informational efficiency to long 
established financial markets. By econometrically establishing an intraday link between return 
predictability and liquidity in the EU-ETS, this paper differs from the previous literature on 
trading activity in the EU-ETS. For example, Frino, Kruk, and Lepone (2010) and Benz and 
Hengelbrock (2009) investigate market liquidity, while Daskalakis (2013) and Montagnoli and 
©2017, Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
8 
 
de Vries (2010) investigate market efficiency in the EU-ETS. However, none of these papers 
examine possible links between carbon pricing and liquidity. Showing this link is important 
from both policy and economic perspectives. Although Ibikunle et al. (2013) suggest that 
carbon instruments with higher levels of liquidity (and lower information asymmetry) are 
priced more efficiently, they did not relate carbon pricing to liquidity. Furthermore, their paper 
mainly focuses on the comparison of carbon market trading activity during regular trading 
hours and after hours using a 10-month period data. Therefore, this current paper, based on a 
40-month trading data, could be viewed as an extension of their work.3  
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows: in the next section we provide the 
background to the study by discussing the EU-ETS and the ECX. Section 3 discusses sample 
selection and describes the data. Section 4 reports our econometric methodology and the 
empirical findings, and finally Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Background to this study 
2.1.The EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
The Kyoto Protocol is an international accord on climate change, agreed in 1997, that came 
into force on 16th February 2005. Under the treaty, developed countries and transition 
economies committed to achieving emission control targets in relation to their 1990 levels. For 
example, Japan committed to a 6% reduction and New Zealand to a 0% increase in emissions. 
The European Union was more ambitious and vowed to reduce its emissions to 8% below the 
1990 levels, where the emission reduction burden per country varies considerably. 
Luxembourg’s -28% and Portugal’s +27% are the most and least ambitious reduction targets, 
respectively. Each party within the Kyoto Protocol can independently decide on the 
                                                            
3 Kalaitzoglou et al. (2013) also examine informed trading in the EU-ETS by focusing on identifying the different 
agents at play in the carbon market. 
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mechanisms used to achieve its emission control targets. The EU opted mainly to employ the 
emissions trading mechanism, as the EU-ETS (see Ellerman, Convery, and De Perthuis, 2010, 
Labatt and White, 2007). 
The greenhouse gas permit trading market has since grown into a multi-billion dollar 
market with Europe leading in its development. The European emissions permit market has 
accounted for more than 95% of the global carbon market for any given year since 20064 (see 
Kossoy and Ambrosi, 2010, Linacre, Kossoy, and Ambrosi, 2011). This is, however, set to 
change as New Zealand, China, Kazakhstan and Switzerland, as well as municipal and state 
governments in Japan, Canada and the United States, have all in recent years begun operating 
similar schemes. Australia adopted its market-based mechanism in 2011, with the aim to link 
up with EU-ETS in 2015. The situation at this time is, however, unclear following a recent 
change in government. 
The EU-ETS is divided into three phases. Phase I (2005-2007) was a trial period before 
the commencement of the actual Kyoto commitment period (Phase II; 2008-2012). Phase II 
forms the basis of our investigations. The EU has committed to a post-Kyoto phase (Phase III, 
2013-2020). This commitment has been supported by a global climate agreement, reached in 
Durban in December 2011. The Durban meeting also raises expectations with respect to the 
achievement of future global climate change agreements (see Ranson and Stavins, 2012). The 
EU-ETS operates as a cap and trade system, while allowing the use of certain external 
emissions permit instruments through the EU Linking Directive 2004/101/EC (see Flåm, 2007). 
This is the main driver for the EU’s emissions reduction target of 8% below 1990 levels over 
the Kyoto commitment period. The EU employs a ‘burden sharing agreement’ allowing it to 
                                                            
4 The concept of permit trading is not, however, novel to the Kyoto Protocol or the EU-ETS – the most prominent 
example of emissions trading until recently has been the United States Acid Rain programme. The Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has employed emissions trading as a policy tool to achieve emissions reductions since 
1992. 
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re-allocate emissions reduction targets within its member states, so as to allow emissions 
growth in less developed EU countries (Council Decision 2002/358/CE). Within its Kyoto 
target, the EU thus allocates individual targets to its constituent nations. This means more 
demanding targets for the larger European economies, such as Germany, than for the smaller 
ones. It then falls on the member countries to identify the installations affected within their 
borders under the aggregated reduction target. Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway (non-EU 
European countries) also participate in the EU-ETS (see Williams and Kittel, 2004). Overall, 
about 12,000 installations are subject to EU-ETS regulations,5 accounting for 40% of the EU’s 
total greenhouse gas emissions. The European Union Allowance (EUA) is the trading permit 
unit (currency) in the EU-ETS. Project based instruments are, however, permitted for 
submission to a specified degree, depending on the phase.6 Annually, firms must submit EUAs 
equal to their verified net emissions for the preceding compliance year to EU authorities (see 
Daskalakis et al., 2011 for a detailed financial overview of the EU-ETS).  
 
2.2. Trading on the European Climate Exchange (ECX) 
The ECX is the largest carbon platform in the EU-ETS and by extension the world. In 
2010, EUA carbon permits constituted more than 84% of the global carbon market value with 
approximately 73% traded as futures contracts (see Kossoy et al., 2010, Linacre et al., 2011). 
The ECX platform is the market leader in EU-ETS exchange-based carbon trading with more 
than 92% market share. Market volumes have also increased significantly from year to year 
since trading started in 2005. It is a derivatives platform and most of the trading activities have 
                                                            
5 The sectors affected are electricity generators, mineral oil refineries, coke ovens, ferrous metals, glass, ceramic 
products and cement manufacturers to glass and pulp producers. Electricity generators are however the leading 
CO2 emitters. By Council decision, in 2012 the aviation sector was brought into the EU-ETS (Directive 
2008/101/EC). A few other sectors are to be included from 2013 onwards. 
6 Project based permits include Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) and Emission Reduction Units (ERUs) 
from Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation (JI) respectively (see Daskalakis, Ibikunle, and 
Diaz-Rainey, 2011). 
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consistently occurred in its December maturity contracts. Ibikunle et al. (2013) estimate that 
since 2009, at least 76% of the trading has occurred in the December contracts. The regular 
futures contracts are marketed on a quarterly expiry cycle: March, June, September and 
December. The underlying for each ECX EUA contract is 1,000 EUAs. The trading system is 
electronic and continuous. Official trading starts at 7:00hrs and ends at 17:00hrs UK local time 
from Monday to Friday. There is, however, a pre-opening trading period of 15 minutes to allow 
for participants to place early orders when planning for the trading day. The market thus opens 
for an initial period between 6:45hrs and 7:00hrs UK local time, with virtually no executed 
orders. The maturity date for the contracts is the last Monday of the traded month, with physical 
settlement occurring within three days following expiry. Carbon Financial Instruments (CFI) 
trading on the ICE ECX platform is done electronically on the ICE platform. The ICE Futures 
Europe platform is accessible only to members for order placement. All valid orders and their 
corresponding executions are anonymous. The electronically executed trades pass through the 
so-called Trade Registration System (TRS) for account allocation.  
 
3. Data 
The sample period runs for most of Phase II of the EU-ETS. We compute all of the 
order imbalance, liquidity and futures returns measures on an instrument-specific basis. The 
use of instrument-specific variables for the examination of pricing dynamics is grounded in the 
microstructure literature (see for example Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan, 1993, Lo 
and MacKinlay, 1990). Serial dependence between days is approximately zero for dynamic 
instruments, which are too heavily traded for anomalies to exist for very long (see Chordia et 
al., 2005). An examination of connections between liquidity and pricing on a platform such as 
the ECX (with actively traded instruments) should therefore be centred on intraday trading. 
Serial dependence in intraday returns has already been reported by Conrad, Rittler, and Rotfuß 
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(2012). The phenomenon is a result of persistence in order flow, which suggests that orders 
move significantly in a particular direction. If the change in direction is for buys, then the 
returns become positively persistent, if it is for sells, the returns will turn persistently negative. 
This persistence in returns will subsist, usually over short intervals, until the order flow is 
balanced by countervailing orders (see Chordia et al., 2005 for a comprehensive analysis of 
this process). The carbon futures order imbalance analysis of Mizrach and Otsubo (2014) using 
daily measures will not, therefore, suffice. As Mizrach et al. (2014) focus on daily order 
imbalance, the results have no relevance for our research questions. We use 15-minute intervals 
as the focus of this study rather than the five-minute intervals used by other studies (see as 
examples Chordia et al., 2008, Chung et al., 2010a, Chung and Hrazdil, 2010b) based on two 
considerations: 
 
1. Concerns regarding non-trading for less actively traded instruments on ECX: since on 
EU-ETS derivative trading platforms the nearest maturity contracts usually account for 
about 80% of trades in emission permits, non-trading is taken into account by extending 
the interval to 15 minutes. 
 
2. Theoretically, a predictive connection between order imbalances and returns in a 
dynamic market should not endure for more than a matter of minutes (for less than 60 
minutes according to Chordia et al., 2005), since market inefficiencies create arbitrage 
opportunities. Trading activity on account of this in turn help regain a measure of 
pricing efficiency. Hence, while non-trading remains an issue, the time interval chosen 
must be short enough to capture the inefficiencies in trading activity.  This informs the 
decision not to extend the interval beyond 15 minutes. 
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Based on the foregoing and the problem of determining serial dependence in the 
presence of non-trading, we restrict our analysis to instruments that are traded relatively 
frequently for a specific compliance year.7 We also follow Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2001) in excluding instruments with differing trading characteristics to the major CFIs traded 
on the exchange. Thus we exclude EUA Daily futures and EUA spreads. Ultimately, only five 
EUA futures contracts with varying trading years are retained in the sample. These are the 
December expiry contracts for 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012.8 Crucially, these December 
maturity contracts account for more than 76% of daily trading volume on the ECX for the 
period under investigation. The dataset obtained directly from the ICE/ECX London platform 
comprises of all intra-day tick-by-tick ECX EUA futures contracts on-screen trades on the ECX 
platform from January 2008 through to April 2011. The dataset contains date, timestamp, 
market identifier, product description, traded month, order identifier, trade sign (bid/offer), 
traded price, quantity traded, parent identifier and trade type. The dataset is split into four 
compliance periods of Phase II, the 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 compliance years. Tick size for 
the entire period is €0.01, having been reduced from €0.05 on 27th March 2007 (during Phase 
I). The division based on regulatory compliance periods is exogenous and provides for a 
practical basis to examine the effect of liquidity on return predictability. 
 
3.1. Order imbalance and return measures 
                                                            
7 If we apply 5-minute intervals as the basis for the measures, we would be forced to examine only one contract 
per year for the period under consideration due to non-trading effects in the other contracts, hence we use 15-
minute intervals. In any case, we conduct a robustness analysis using only the highest volume contract, which is 
the nearest maturity contract, per year. We find that sampling at 5-minute intervals leaves our inferences 
unchanged. 
8 The delineation of the contracts analysed for each year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For 
Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 
2011 maturities are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 
2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011. 
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We begin our enquiry into the links between liquidity and pricing by computing the 
variables employed for most of this paper. In the dataset, all trades are labelled as either buyer 
initiated or seller initiated, hence we do not need to algorithmically allocate trade classifications. 
We use two order imbalance methods based on nominal trades and the euro weight of trades 
respectively. Nominal order imbalance (OIBQt) for each CFI and for each 15-minute interval 
is calculated using equation (1), while the euro order imbalance (OIB€t) is simply the weighing 
of (1) with euro trading value of the trades, as shown in equation (2).9 The nominal order 
imbalance is non-weighted and thus fails to account for the economic significance of the trades, 
unlike the euro order imbalance measure. For most of the analysis we therefore employ the 
latter measure of order imbalance.  
                                                                   )( )( tt tt SELLBUY
SELLBUY
tOIBQ 
                                                          (1) 
                                                              OIB€ t  (€ BUYt€ SELLt )(€ BUYt€ SELLt )                                                  (2) 
For each CFI, the measures are calculated for every 15-minute interval in a trading day. 
In computing the 15-minute returns variable, we use the last transaction prices for every 15-
minute period.10 Although returns are viewed as being less biased when computed from quotes 
than from transaction prices, we face two challenges in computing from quotes. First, 
heterogeneities exist for trading rates of occurrence for CFIs on the ECX as a result of the high 
level of differing trading frequencies. Potentially, the results will be biased and contradictory 
since the method could result in returns being computed over different spans for different CFIs. 
One should also be mindful that computing returns with transaction prices could be affected by 
bid-ask bounce. However, the summary statistics of trading prices for each of the four 
                                                            
9 We also examine the possibility that our order imbalance measures may reflect exogenous shocks by computing 
absolute values for liquid and low liquidity periods as described in page 259 of Chordia et al. (2008) for robustness. 
As reported in Section 4.3, the results show that there is very low variation across the liquid and illiquid days; 
hence the results are not affected by exogenous impact. 
10 We also use the mid-point of the last bid and ask transaction prices for every 15-minute period with similar 
outcomes. 
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compliance periods suggests that this is not a significant source of concern in the ECX dataset. 
Also, since our analyses are based on contract-specific measures, we mitigate the problem of 
non-synchronicity. In addition, when a contract fails to trade at t-1, we do not use it when 
constructing the market aggregate measure at time t. We therefore employ the transaction 
prices for computing the return variable for each fifteen-minute period such that the return for 
10.15am is computed using the last trade at 10:00am and the last trade at 10:15am. For all 
analyses utilising lagged estimates, the earliest 15-minute interval for each trading session/day 
is removed since it is connected to the lagged interval of the foregoing trading session. 
 
3.2. Liquidity measures 
We adopt two measures of short-term liquidity constructed using transaction prices at 
regular 15-minute intervals. Relative spread, the main measure of liquidity used, is given as 
the best/highest traded bid price minus the best/lowest traded ask price. This is then divided by 
the average of the best traded bid and best traded ask price for every 15-minute period. Traded 
spread, the second measure of liquidity employed, is defined as the best traded bid price minus 
the best traded ask price over the same interval.11 The traded spread is computed for use in 
robustness analysis and most of the results for it are not presented in this paper. 
Contract-specific daily bid-ask spread measures are first computed and then aggregated 
cross-sectionally across the CFI samples to obtain a market-wide liquidity value. Four 
exogenous liquidity periods are identified based on compliance periods available in Phase II of 
the EU-ETS. The sample thus spans 40-months of trading based on available data. Period (i) 
runs from 2nd January 2008 until December 31st 2008; period (ii) from 2nd January 2009 until 
December 31st 2009; period (iii) from 4th January 2010 until December 31st 2010; and period 
                                                            
11 We also compute the measures with traded bid and ask prices at the stroke of each 15-minute period. The results 
are very similar with no material variation in values.  
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(iv) from 3rd January 2011 until April 29th 2011. Period (iv) is restricted by data availability for 
this study. The four periods correspond to Phase II-Year I, Phase II-Year II, Phase II-Year III 
and Phase II-Year IV respectively. Since they jointly represent two-thirds of Phase II, they 
have a good degree of representativeness. 
 
4. Results and discussion 
4.1. Summary statistics 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for traded spread, relative spread, market returns and 
the two order imbalance measures. The samples are representative of values for all contracts 
examined in the assigned periods, with the exclusion of those missing observations (i.e. when 
no trading occurs). The statistics clearly show a strong improvement in liquidity over the four 
compliance periods. The mean traded and relative spread measures for Phase II-Year I are 
€0.1197 and 0.0043 respectively. These decrease substantially by 74% and 56% to €0.031374 
and 0.001918 in Year IV for the traded and relative spreads respectively. Order imbalance 
measures generally increase in magnitude, progressing from negative (-0.005787 and €-
0.08279) in Year I to positive values in the Year IV (0.02042 and €0.002767) for OIBQt and 
OIB€t respectively.  The statistics are similar to those of Chordia et al. (2008) and thus show a 
market with an increasing ratio of bid trades to ask trades. Markets with the highest levels of 
pricing efficiency usually record more bid than ask trades, since arbitrage traders operate from 
neutral positions, from which they bid for opportunities.  
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2. Correlations 
Table 2 shows correlation coefficients for (lags of) the two order imbalance measures 
and the futures returns. As one would expect, and consistent with Chordia et al. (2008), the 
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order imbalance measures are clearly highly correlated, except for in Year I, however all are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. The return is not as highly correlated with the order 
imbalance measures. These results are more in line with correlations between daily horizon 
measures, as reported in Chordia et al. (2005), where very low correlations are reported 
between daily order imbalance measures and returns. Although it may be surprising that we 
record statistically significant negative correlations for Year II, this is not unusual, especially 
when frequencies of less than five minutes are used in computing the return and order 
imbalance measures (see Chordia et al., 2005). For other periods and for the OIBQt measure, 
the correlation coefficients are positive and also statistically significant. For OIB€t, only Year 
III returns a coefficient that is not statistically significant at all levels tested. The initial 
expectation here is that of a high correlation of returns with the order imbalance measures. 
Although this is not the case, the correlation analysis results are by no means conclusive 
evidence of the link between returns and order imbalance on the ECX. It is important to 
understand that while there are already several investment vehicles on the carbon trading 
platform, the main aim of the market is not for wealth creation, but rather to establish an 
emission-constrained economy. This complicates the picture for the market efficiency-liquidity 
relationship we are investigating. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
4.3. Predictive regressions, market efficiency and liquidity 
We employ Chordia et al. (2008) returns predictability model (3) to estimate the level 
of short-horizon efficiency. If rett is the contract return and OrderImbalancet-1 corresponds to 
either of OIBQt or OIB€t during the previous 15-minute interval, then; 
                                                  ttt balanceOrderret  11 Im                               (3) 
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Based on results of the correlation analysis, the expectations for the predictive regressions are 
not very clear. Table 3 reports results for the predictive regressions of 15-minute returns on lag 
order imbalance measures. Panel A shows the results for regressions run with the OIBQt 
measure and Panel B for the OIB€t measure. The results are not stable across the various periods 
for both regressions. For the regressions run with the entire sample, the results suggest that on 
the ECX, lagged order imbalance is not a significant predictor for short-run returns and this is 
consistent for both order imbalance measures. However, different findings are obtained for the 
period-based results. For example, in Panel A, for Phase II, Year I, Phase II, Year III and Phase 
II, Year IV, the OIBQt coefficients (significance-values) are 0.000325 (0.08), 0.000368 (0.02) 
and 0.000441 (0.03) respectively. The R2 for the two periods are 0.025%, 0.022% and 0.0054% 
respectively. Similarly, and more significantly, in four of the periods considered using the 
OIB€t measure, Panel B reports statistically significant coefficients for three of the periods. In 
Years I, II and IV of Phase II trading, the OIB€t coefficients (significance levels) are 0.000582 
(5%), 0.000547 (10%) and 0.000436 (10%) respectively. The R2 values for the three periods 
are respectively 0.023%, 0.02% and 0.009%. Thus, if the overall estimates for the 40-month 
period examined are not considered, we can see the influence of order imbalances in the 
determination of market returns. It is evident that this explanatory power decreases with each 
passing period, which is consistent with Chordia et al. (2008). These results indicate that return 
predictability decreases over the period under examination, and thus as argued by Chordia et 
al. (2008), the reduction in return predictability enhances pricing efficiency.  
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Considering the trading frequency on the ECX and the intervals of 15-minutes 
examined, these values are substantial and provide a basis to explore further the hypothesis that 
lagged order imbalance influences short-run returns. Since there is a suggestion of period 
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dependency to the estimates, we examine next how pricing has evolved over the four periods. 
We run monthly predictive regressions for the 40 months under observation, starting with 
January 2008 and ending with April 2011. For this purpose and subsequently, we use the OIB€t 
as the sole order imbalance measure, since it represents the economic significance of the trading 
imbalance and its results in Table 3 are more significant. We expect that as the market’s pricing 
efficiency improves, the power of order imbalance in predicting short-run returns diminishes; 
hence R2 values are expected to drop progressively over the entire period. Figure 1 shows a 
plot of the monthly regressions R2 values and t-statistics for the entire period. The plot shows 
the R2, decreasing from a height of 1.4831% in September 2008 to 0.0004% in February 2011. 
The t-statistic values have remained largely stable and positive, especially over the April 2009-
April 2011 period. The values hit a peak of 3.81 in February 2008 and end with a value of 1.08 
in April 2011.  
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In keeping with Chordia et al. (2008) and Chung and Hrazdil (2010a), we next examine 
the connections between liquidity and market efficiency, which is the main object of this study. 
The most straightforward means to proxy liquidity is to examine the bid-ask spread. Traded 
spread is therefore measured as the highest bid minus the lowest ask price.  A variant of this 
(see Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) is the relative spread. It is defined as the traded spread 
divided by the average of the bid and ask prices. Although liquidity is clearly an important 
component of the cost of trading, Amihud (2002) suggests an alternative that is argued to more 
directly proxy liquidity.  In less liquid markets, any given level of trading volume will give rise 
to a greater price response than in liquid markets. The Amihud (2002) ratio is therefore defined 
as the ratio of the absolute return to trading volume. However trading volume is likely to be 
greater for economically larger instruments, thus creating a large firm bias. For robustness, we 
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therefore also adopt the Florackis, Gregoriou, and Kostakis (2011) measure, in which volume 
in the Amihud (2002) ratio is replaced by the turnover ratio.  The principle is similar, in that a 
greater price movement is anticipated for illiquid markets for any given proportion of the asset 
traded. The advantage of this measure over the Amihud (2002) ratio is that there is no 
significant correlation between instrument trading size and the turnover ratio. The Amihud 
(2002) and Florackis et al. (2011) ratios are given as equations (4) and (5) below respectively:  
                                                     it itditdit Dd VRDitAmihud 1 ||1                                                         (4) 
                                                   it itditdit Dd TRRDitFlorackis 1 ||1                                                         (5), 
where Ritd, Vitd and TRitd are the return, euro volume and turnover ratio of EUA futures contract 
i on day d at month t and Dit is the number of trading days in month t for EUA futures i. Larger 
values therefore indicate that the market is less liquid.  
Figure 2 presents the time series plot of relative and traded spread over the 40-month period 
under observation.12 As can be seen, both measures of liquidity are consistent. Conspicuously, 
there is a sustained narrowing of the market spread over the entire period, suggesting that 
liquidity improves with time on the ECX.13 Furthermore, there seems to be a noticeable blip 
around the start of trading for each period. This shows a temporary loss of liquidity, perhaps 
present as a result of some form of calendar effect.14  
                                                            
12 Further, we employ the traded spread in all other sections of this paper for robustness examinations. In all 
instances, the results yielded are not materially different from those yielded by our use of the relative spread. The 
results presented in this paper are thus robust to substitute liquidity proxies. 
13 Given the period examined in this paper, it is possible that the tapering off of the effects of the global financial 
crisis might have influenced liquidity and the enhancement of pricing efficiency during the Phase II of the EU-
ETS. However, this consideration has no implication for the main focus of this study – the intraday links between 
return predictability and liquidity. This is because there is no basis to expect that illiquidity is jointly determined 
with signed order imbalances (see also Chordia et al., 2008).  
14 Ibikunle and Gregoriou (2011), using the market model (Brown and Warner, 1985), examine calendar effects 
on the European Energy Exchange (EEX) carbon platform and find no significant effect. We nevertheless apply 
several dummy regressions to capture the effects of specific dates in further analyses. As discussed in Section 4.3, 
the dummy coefficients and respective t-statistics imply that the events have no intraday impact on our results. 
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[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
The results for the price impact ratios are presented in Figure 3. It can be seen that the 
evolutions of the measures are consistent with Figure 2.  
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
In reference to Blume, Mackinlay, and Terker (1989) and Cox and Peterson (1994), the 
impact of illiquidity is more significant during periods of very low liquidity. In view of this, 
and in order to maintain consistency with Chordia et al. (2008), we split the days in our sample 
based on those that are considered liquid and those that are relatively illiquid. The illiquid days 
are defined as those whose average relative spread for that day is at least one standard deviation 
above the mean relative spread for a surrounding period over (-30, +30).15  
In Table 4, we present descriptive statistics for relative spreads on high and low 
liquidity days over the 40-month period. The general trend is that the number of illiquid days, 
as a proportion of the total number of trading days in the respective periods, decreases from 
year to year. In Phase II, Year I, Phase II, Year II, Phase II, Year III and Phase II, Year IV16, 
for example, the proportion of illiquid days as percentages of total number of trading days are 
13.58%, 12.89%, 10.87% and 9.33% respectively. The gradual improvement evident here is 
consistent with Figures 2 and 3. If considered in tandem with Figure 1, there is a suggestion 
                                                            
15 We also employ the (-60, +60) window as used by Chung and Hrazdil (2010a), with no substantial differences 
in the number of liquid and illiquid days. For robustness, we econometrically estimate effective half-spread for 
days in a randomly selected month in each year using the Huang and Stoll (1997) spread decomposition model. 
The distribution of liquid/illiquid days observed is not qualitatively dissimilar to the one we use above. 
16 In Year IV, the 7 illiquid days have lower spread values than the liquid days. This underscores the limitations 
to our definition of illiquid days, which we control by using another window and seeing very small qualitative 
differences in the distribution of illiquid days. Suppose we have a period of low spreads leading to April (when 
compliance traders must submit emission permits) as a result of perceived increase in trading activity, and suppose 
most of our illiquid days are around this period. Then we are likely to obtain ‘illiquid’ days with lower average 
spread than the average of the vastly larger number of liquid days. This is plausible since our definition of 
illiquidity is relative to only a given number of surrounding days in the year for every illiquid day. Moreover, the 
differences in the values are so small that they are not statistically different from one another, even at the 10% 
level. The same case is made for the mean values in Year III. 
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that market efficiency improves when the market is more liquid.17  We next test for this 
empirically. 
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
In order to empirically analyse the effect of liquidity on the evolution of market efficiency, we 
interact the order imbalance variable (OIB€t) with a low-liquidity day dummy. For every day 
on which the average relative spread is at least one standard deviation above the mean relative 
spread for a surrounding period over (-30, +30), the dummy takes on the value of 1 and 0 
otherwise. If ILDt corresponds to the low liquidity dummy on day t, then model (3) becomes;  
                  tttt ILDbalanceOrderbalanceOrderret   *ImIm 1211                           (6) 
The regression model (6) is thus run such that on low liquidity days, the lagged OIB€t variable 
with the dummy interaction becomes OIB€t-1 and 0 on other days18. In Table 5, we present the 
results for the regression analysis. In this analysis, we focus on the significance of the 
interaction term, coefficient β2. The coefficients for three of the examined periods are positive 
and statistically significant.  For Phase II, Year I, the coefficient is 0.003341 (p-value = 0.00). 
Also for Phase II, Year II, the coefficient is 0.003313 (p-value = 0.00). The trend holds also 
for the final year under consideration, Phase II-Year IV, with a coefficient of 0.0021 (p-value 
= 0.03). As in Panel B of Table 3, the Phase II, Year III period does not conform to the general 
trend observed for the other periods. The highest coefficient value is recorded for Year I, and 
decreases from then on until a slight rise in Year IV. One reason that could be advanced for the 
                                                            
17 The percentage proportion of median relative spread on illiquid days to liquid days for Years I, II, III and IV 
are 119%, 125%, 101% and 90% respectively. These values (except for Year IV for which we have data for only 
1/3 of the year) is consistent with the expectation that the average spread for low liquidity days will be higher than 
that of liquid days. 
18 We also carry out robustness tests by including dummies for specific day-after events such as the submission 
of annual emission reports, national allocation plans (NAP) and annual emission results announcements. We 
include dummies for days preceding specific holidays in the U.K. The resultant coefficients show that the events 
are not significant to our investigations on intraday basis; also our earlier results are not materially altered.   
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deviation of Phase II, Year III (i.e. 2010) is the inability of the United Nation’s Conference of 
Parties to reach a highly expected and ambitious agreement on global climate policy in 
December 2009 at Copenhagen. The failure to achieve the expected goals set for the 
Copenhagen conference thus appear to have impacted the carbon markets in subsequent months.  
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The coefficients on lagged order imbalance (β1) are all statistically insignificant.  This 
implies that where lagged order imbalance is found to affect/predict returns, it does so only 
when the market is illiquid.  Results in Table 5 show that this finding on illiquidity and lagged 
order flow explains a greater proportion of variation in returns.  Consistent with NASDAQ and 
NYSE evidence by Chung et al. (2010b) and Chordia et al. (2008) respectively, the R2 values 
decrease from Year I to Year IV. For example, in Year I, the R2 is 0.0038, but by Year IV, this 
has diminished to 0.000451. This observed decline in the explanatory power of the periodic 
models and their significance is consistent with the gradual improvement in liquidity reported 
in Figures 2 and 3, as well as in Table 1. Adjustments in liquidity thus affect levels of market 
efficiency. The liquidity improvements over 15-minute periods, which lead to enhanced pricing 
efficiency, may be connected with the activities of arbitrageurs as reported by Kalaitzoglou et 
al. (2013). The reported dominant role of liquidity traders in the EU-ETS, as reported by Bredin 
et al. (2011), is important for the provision of counterparties for arbitrageurs when order 
imbalance occurs or intensifies.   
Exogenous impacts can lead to extreme order imbalances, which can in turn result in a 
loss of liquidity. Thus in our analysis, using the low liquidity dummy on OIB€t to determine 
the impact of liquidity, rather than capturing the effect of liquidity in improving market 
efficiency we may well have been picking up the impact of exogenous shocks. In order to 
examine this possibility we therefore construct absolute order imbalances for liquid and illiquid 
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periods following the method of Chordia et al. (2008). We construct these measures for all four 
of the periods and find only minimal variations across both the liquid and illiquid days. This 
result implies that our results indeed capture the real role of liquidity in improving market 
efficiency, along with several other checks mentioned in the footnotes. As discussed by 
Chordia et al. (2008), it is illogical to assume that illiquidity is jointly determined with signed 
order imbalances. If an illiquidity-inducing event that is exogenous to the market does occur, 
one should expect to see as fewer buy orders as sell orders. 
 
4.4. Granger causality analyses 
 As an additional check of robustness and to further explore the notion that narrowing 
spreads on day t results in improved pricing on day t+1, we carry out Granger causality tests 
(see Granger, 1969) relating past values of the liquidity proxy to order imbalance.19 This is 
undertaken by estimating a vector autoregressive model (VAR), in this case with two 
dependent variables. The first, φ, is the daily relative spread liquidity proxy.  The second, δ, 
denotes the daily mean of the 15-minute Euro order imbalance measure for each EUA futures 
contract traded.  The lag length, l, is chosen to purge autocorrelation. This results in a model 
of the following form: 
                                 
tlltlltt
tlltlltt




1111110
1111110
......
......                              (7) 
                                                            
19 The structure of the VAR analysis in this section is different from that of the preceding analysis, where we aim 
to capture return predictability, which could only be adequately investigated on an intraday basis. Conducting the 
VAR analysis using daily frequency data following the aggregation of 15-minute interval data into daily measures 
should have no implication for the results other than to reduce the probability of establishing a statistical 
relationship. This is because a reduction in the degrees of freedom afforded by the use of daily aggregates of our 
liquidity and order imbalance measures should make it harder to establish a statistical relationship. Therefore, the 
results we obtain only serve to underscore the fact that past values of liquidity proxies do indeed help to explain 
variations in pricing. 
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The equations in model 7 are estimated simultaneously for each of the four periods.  The 
statistics presented in Table 6 are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis: 
                                                           0...21  l                                                       (8)                         
for each of the equations in (7). The null tested is that δ does not Granger-cause φ in the top 
equation and that φ does not Granger-cause δ in the bottom equation. We run these equations 
on a contract-specific basis for each period; the results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
Panel A shows that the hypothesis that liquidity improvements on a given day do not 
inform pricing during the next is strongly rejected for all tested contracts for the first three 
periods. For the fourth period, which includes trading data for only 82 days of trading, we 
cannot reject this hypothesis. There is also evidence of two-way causation with respect to the 
Dec-2009 (Phase II, Year II), Dec-2010 (Phase II, Year III), Dec-2011 (Phase II, Year III) and 
the Dec-2012 (Phase II, Year III) EUA futures contracts. Broadly therefore, the evidence of a 
two-way causation cannot be conclusively established since it affects contracts only in specific 
periods. Further, the same contracts are not affected uniformly across all periods in which they 
are tested. In order to explore further the possibility of bi-directional causality in the futures 
contracts, we also run the VAR on a contract-specific basis without recourse to sub periods. 
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. Again, there is substantial evidence of Granger 
causality running from liquidity to order imbalance. However a two-way causation is only 
observed in the case of the Dec-2012 contract. The evidence in Table 6 therefore further 
confirms our overriding hypothesis that liquidity on emissions permit trading platforms results 
in more efficient trading. 
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4.5. Variance ratios: measuring randomness of returns 
A key assertion in this paper is that the predictability of intraday (short-run) return from 
order imbalances (order flow) is an inverse indicator of pricing efficiency. Chordia et al. (2008) 
propose another procedure involving the measuring of randomness of returns series. This 
requires the comparison of variance ratios over short and long horizons. The variances of long-
horizon returns are divided by the estimated variance for returns over shorter intervals. For a 
market in harmony with the random walk process, the variance of returns measured over longer 
horizons is equal to the sum of variances of shorter horizon returns as long as the summation 
of the shorter horizons is equal to that of the longer horizon. Based on our earlier results, we 
maintain the hypothesis that, during liquid spells, there will be fewer deviations from random 
walk benchmarks, i.e. the variance ratios will be closer to one for each instrument. We concede 
the point made by Grossman and Miller (1988) that divergence from a random walk can be 
induced by inventory related issues due to return serial correlation. However in a largely 
efficient market arbitrage opportunities created by this deviation will lure participants into 
providing the required liquidity, hence the divergence from a random walk will be very much 
temporary, even if market makers cannot absorb orders (see also Admati et al., 1988). 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
For each instrument within each period, we compute 15-minute returns as described in 
section 3 and also for opening to closing returns for all trading days. We then compute the 
variance ratio by multiplying the 15-minute return variance by the number of 15-minute periods 
in a trading day. In a market conforming to a random walk process the variance ratio values 
will be close to one. Table 7 presents the results of the Variance ratio analysis for contracts 
traded in each period, as well as value weighted variance ratios for each period. The weight 
employed is the total trading value per instrument. As expected, consistent with Figure 2 and 
Table 1, the overall variance ratio values decrease progressively from 3.74 in Year I to 1.39 in 
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Year III. These values rise slightly to 1.42 in first four months of Year IV. It is therefore evident 
that as the market becomes more liquid and the EUA futures contracts are traded faster with 
minimal impact on their prices, the market approaches a variance ratio of unity; that is, it 
conforms more to the random walk process. Given that the variance ratio analysis implicitly 
assumes that deviations from the random walk benchmark reflects higher levels of noise in the 
trading process, the results suggest that noise trading generally decreased from 2008 to 2011 
in the EU-ETS. A decrease in trading-related noise also implies higher market quality, and thus 
we confirm earlier results that pricing/trading efficiency has improved within the sample period. 
Another trend in Table 7 is the propensity for the least traded contracts during a specific period 
to have the highest variance ratios. For example, in Year I, the Dec-2010 contract is the least 
traded and has a ratio of 16.61, more than seven times the value for the most traded contract in 
Year I (Dec-2008). The ratio disparity is, however, less severe in later years. For example, the 
Dec-2012 ratio in Year III is only about twice the value of that of the Dec-2010 contract. The 
results therefore support the expectation that divergence from random walk benchmarks is less 
severe if markets are liquid.  
 
5. Concluding discussion 
The EU-ETS is the largest emissions trading experiment in the world. Although there 
are now about 17 other compulsory schemes elsewhere in the world, the success of the EU-
ETS would still provide a strong impetus for the formulation of a truly global market-driven 
climate change policy given that it drives more than 90% of global carbon trading. However, 
to the best of our knowledge, no study has been undertaken on the contemporaneous linkages 
between pricing efficiency and liquidity in the EU-ETS. Our work focuses on the link between 
efficiency and liquidity and hence contributes to the understanding of this market and provides 
evidence of its efficacy. Theoretically, returns predictability on an efficient market should be 
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momentary, infrequent and, in the event it occurs, arbitrageurs should provide the necessary 
pool for order absorption.  
In this paper, we investigate the predictability of returns from intraday order flow across 
40 months of trading on the world’s largest emissions trading platform. We provide evidence 
that while return predictability occurs on the platform, it has significantly decreased since the 
start of Phase II in 2008 and continues to decline over the entire period investigated. The prices 
of each instrument are thus closer to the random walk benchmark as the scheme evolves.  
Our results are consistent with previous studies which have investigated separately both 
liquidity and market efficiency. For example, Frino et al. (2010) find that aggregate long-term 
liquidity improves over the course of Phase I and during the early months of Phase II. Ibikunle 
et al. (2011) show liquidity improvements on account of enhanced regulations early on in Phase 
II, while Benz et al. (2009) also report an improvement in quarterly measures of liquidity over 
time in Phase I. With respect to market efficiency of the EU-ETS in Phase II, our results are in 
line with Daskalakis (2013), Ibikunle et al. (2013) and Montagnoli et al. (2010). Indeed the 
results of most of the existing studies investigating either the liquidity or efficiency of carbon 
financial instruments are similar to our findings. However, one recent study on European 
carbon market efficiency that appears inconsistent with the general view is that of Charles, 
Darné, and Fouilloux (2013). Their suggestion that the European carbon market in Phase II 
might has been inefficient is related to their approach to estimating and defining market 
efficiency, both of which involve estimating whether spot and futures instruments in the EU-
ETS conform to the cost of carry relationship.  
Although the aforementioned studies examine market liquidity or efficiency during 
various trading phases of the EU-ETS, none links market efficiency to market liquidity. 
Furthermore, these studies do not provide the level of intraday exposition we have presented 
in this paper, since we examine pricing and liquidity dynamics over 15-minute periods. This 
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level of analysis is important to several stakeholders, especially carbon instruments’ investors, 
who are most active across the trading day. This is because intraday prices usually have the 
most influence on trader sentiment, and thus intraday trading activity better captures market 
dynamics. 
Based on our results and the assumption that the loss of market efficiency leads to 
arbitrage openings, one can conclude that arbitrage activities, especially when the market is 
more liquid, lead to more efficient pricing. Hence, we provide the first evidence that for 
emissions permit trading platforms, liquidity enhances pricing efficiency. The importance of 
our study is further underscored by the fact that the cost of hedging increases when efficiency 
decreases in futures markets (see Krehbiel and Adkins, 1993). Therefore, the findings in this 
paper have significant implications for more than just academic stakeholders. A number of 
policy makers and key stakeholders around the world remain sceptical of the effectiveness of 
market-led approaches in reducing GHG emissions. By testing the pricing efficiency of the 
ECX over a 40-month period, we provide a starting point to examine the validity of this 
scepticism. Policy makers (including departments responsible for the environment, energy 
policy, fiscal policy, trade policy and competitiveness) around the world could be reassured 
that improving market liquidity improves the financial instrument pricing capacity of carbon 
markets. This understanding could be crucial as representatives of more than 190 countries 
gather in Paris in December of 2015 to negotiate a new global climate change legislation. Our 
research also has implications for practitioners who must trade on or via EU-ETS platforms in 
order to comply with EU Climate Change legislations. For example, compliance traders can 
benefit from a stronger understanding of the carbon market dynamics. This understanding can 
be employed in formulating carbon investment strategies and effective carbon risk management.  
While this paper investigates the evolving relationship between market liquidity and 
efficiency over an extensive period in the EU-ETS, our approach, based on intraday order 
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imbalance, return and liquidity dynamics, means that we are unable to directly/adequately test 
the efficiency impact of events in the EU-ETS. This is because there is no basis to expect that 
liquidity is jointly determined with order imbalances. Therefore, future research could consider 
a different analytical approach aimed at testing the efficiency impacts of key policy and 
economic events. Although several papers have conducted event studies to examine the impact 
of events on carbon prices, none has directly investigated the effect of these events on pricing 
efficiency. Furthermore, the ECX from which we have sourced our data is the most liquid 
platform in the EU-ETS and in the world. Future research could therefore investigate return 
predictability in relation to liquidity on less liquid platforms as well.
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Figure 1 
Market Efficiency measured by 15-minute return predictions with 15-minute lagged Euro Order Imbalance 
 
 The figure shows the plot of predictive R2s and corresponding t-statistics obtained from monthly regressions using 15-min predictive regressions for EUA Futures contracts on 
the ECX. OrderImbalance€t-1 is given as the Euro value of buyer initiated trades less Euro value of seller initiated trades, then divided by the total Euro value of trades over the 
15-minute interval, t-1. The Rett computed for every 15-minute interval using the last trade at every interval is the return at interval, t. The following regression is thus estimated: 
ttt balanceOrderret  1Im  
The data is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. 
The delineation of the contracts analysed for each year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are 
used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 maturities are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 
maturities are used for Year 2011. Note that none of the R2 values is actually zero. 
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Figure 2 
Daily Average Traded spread and Relative spread for ECX, 2008-2012 
 
  
The Figure shows the plot of daily average of liquidity measures, traded spread and relative spread. Traded spread (TSPR) is the difference of best traded bid and ask prices for 
every 15-minute period; relative spread (RSPR) is defined as the best traded bid minus the best traded ask price, then divided by the average of the best traded bid and best ask 
over the same intervals. The spreads are averaged across the day for each instrument and cross-sectionally across all instruments. The data is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and 
spans 2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. The delineation of the contracts analysed for 
each year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 
2011 maturities are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011. 
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Figure 3 
Monthly Illiquidity/Price Impact Ratios 
 
 The figure shows the plot of monthly computed illiquidity ratios of Amihud (2002) and Florackis et al. (2011), respectively given below as (i) and (ii):  
 
                                                       it itditdit Dd VRDitAmihud 1 ||1                                            (i) 
                                                  it itditdit Dd TRRDitFlorackis 1 ||1                                        (ii), 
where Ritd, Vitd and TRitd are the return, euro volume and turnover ratio of EUA futures contract i on day d at month t and Dit is the number of trading days in month t for EUA 
futures i. The ratios are averaged cross-sectionally across all instruments. The data is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The data 
includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded on the ECX during the period. The delineation of the contracts analysed for each year, based on trading activity 
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constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 maturities are used; for Year 
2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for 15-minute liquidity and order imbalance proxies 
  
  Traded Spread (€) Relative Spread OIBQt OIB€t 
Entire sample  Mean 69.00 3.45 -18.90 -28.70 
T= 847  Median 54.00 2.88  0.24 -21.40 
t= 58,836  Std. Dev. 51.00 2.10 210.00 200.00 
      
Phase II, Year I  Mean 120.00 4.31 -5.79 -82.80 
T= 256  Median 103.00 3.75  6.12 -89.50 
t= 14,125  Std. Dev. 58.00 2.17 330.00 250.00 
      
Phase II, Year II  Mean 65.00 4.26 -30.20 -12.50 
T= 254  Median 60.00 3.70 -14.10 14.80 
t= 18,550  Std. Dev. 29.00 2.34 180.00 210.00 
      
Phase II, Year III  Mean 34.00 2.28 -26.90 -14.20 
T= 255  Median 31.00 2.10 -20.90 -15.70 
t= 21,239  Std. Dev. 11.00 0.80 140.00 170.00 
      
Phase II, Year IV  Mean 31.00 1.92 20.4 2.77 
T= 82  Median 25.00 1.55 1.90 7.77 
t= 4,922  Std. Dev. 17.00 0.94 90.00 130.00 
This table shows descriptive statistics for liquidity and order imbalance measures computed from trading data for the ECX; all presented values are multiplied by a factor of 
103. Traded spread is the difference of best traded bid and ask prices for every 15-minute period; relative spread is defined as the best traded bid minus the best traded ask price, 
then divided by the average of the best traded bid and best ask over the same intervals. The spreads are averaged across the day for each instrument and cross-sectionally across 
all instruments. OIBQt is the difference between the number buyer initiated trades and seller initiated trades, divided by total trades over every 15-minute interval in a trading 
day. OIB€t is given as the Euro value of buyer initiated trades less Euro value of seller initiated trades, then divided by the total Euro value of trades over the same interval. T 
is the total number of days during a trading period/year; t is the aggregate number 15-minute intervals for all the instruments. The data is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 
2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. The delineation of the contracts analysed for each 
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year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 
maturities are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011.
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Table 2 
Correlations for 15-minute trading intervals on the ECX 
 
  Return OIBQt-1 
Whole Sample (2008-2011) OIBQt-1 0.01   
t= 58,836 OIB€t-1 0.00 0.53*** 
       
Phase II, Year I OIBQt-1 0.02*   
t= 14,125 OIB€t-1 0.02* 0.39*** 
       
Phase II, Year II OIBQt-1 -0.01*   
t= 18,550 OIB€t-1 -0.01* 0.80*** 
       
Phase II, Year III OIBQt-1  0.02**   
t= 21,239 OIB€t-1 0.01 0.64*** 
       
Phase II, Year IV OIBQt-1 0.02   
t= 4,922 OIB€t-1 0.03** 0.55*** 
 
The table shows correlations values for three variables. OIBQt is the difference between number buyer initiated trades 
and seller initiated trades, divided by total trades over every 15-minute interval in a trading day. OIB€t is given as the 
Euro value of buyer initiated trades less Euro value of seller initiated trades, then divided by the total Euro value of 
trades over the same interval. The return is computed for every 15-minute interval using the last trade at every interval. 
t is the aggregate number of 15 minute intervals for all the instruments. The data is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and 
spans 2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the 
period. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The delineation of the 
contracts analysed for each year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 
2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 maturities are used; for Year 2010, 
December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011. 
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Table 3 
Predictive regressions of 15-min returns on lagged Order Imbalance 
 
Panel A 
 
Dependent Variable: Rett 
Whole Sample (2008-2011) Coefficient t-statistic  
Intercept 0.35 0.13  
OIBQt-1 18.10 1.46  
R-squared   3.60 
    
Phase II, Year I    
Intercept -5.09 -0.84  
OIBQt-1 32.50* 1.77  
R-squared   25.30 
    
Phase II, Year II    
Intercept -1.23 -0.19  
OIBQt-1 0.36 1.00  
R-squared   24.40 
    
Phase II, Year III    
Intercept 2.69 1.19  
OIBQt-1 36.80** 2.32  
R-squared   22.20 
    
Phase II, Year IV    
Intercept 7.54** 2.08  
OIBQt-1 44.1** 2.10  
R-squared   5.40 
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Panel B 
 
Dependent Variable: Rett 
Whole Sample (2008-2011) Coefficient t-Statistic  
Intercept -0.17 -0.07  
OIB€t-1 5.90 0.46  
R-squared   0.40 
    
Phase II, Year I    
Intercept -8.28** -2.34  
OIB€t-1 0.58** 2.07  
R-squared   22.90 
    
Phase II, Year II    
Intercept -0.84 -0.14  
OIB€t-1 54.7* 1.84  
R-squared   18.30 
    
Phase II, Year III    
Intercept 1.96 0.88  
OIB€t-1 0.18 1.36  
R-squared   8.70 
    
Phase II, Year IV    
Intercept -1.67 -0.26  
OIB€t-1 0.44* 1.80  
R-squared   8.68 
 
Panel A shows results for 15-min predictive regressions for EUA Futures contracts on the ECX. OIBQt-1 is the difference 
between number buyer initiated trades and seller initiated trades, divided by total trades over the 15-minute interval, t-
1. The Rett, computed for every 15-minute interval using the last trade at every interval is the return at interval, t. Panel 
B shows results for 15-min predictive regressions for EUA Futures contracts on the ECX. OIB€t-1 is given as the Euro 
value of buyer initiated trades less Euro value of seller initiated trades, then divided by the total Euro value of trades 
over the 15-minute interval, t-1. The Rett, computed for every 15-minute interval, using the last trade at every interval, 
is the return at interval, t. Specifically, the following regression is estimated using least squares with Newey and West 
(1987) HAC: 
ttt balanceOrderret  1Im  
All coefficient and R2 values are multiplied by a factor of 105. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. The data used is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January 2008-29th April 2011. 
The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. The delineation of the contracts 
analysed for each year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 
and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 maturities are used; for Year 2010, 
December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011.
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Table 4 
Distribution of liquid and illiquid days on the ECX (2008-2011) 
 
  Relative Spread on liquid days Relative Spread on illiquid days 
Phase II, Year I  Mean 4.31 4.37 
  Median 3.74 4.45 
  Std. Dev. 2.22 0.85 
 Sample days, T 223 33 
    
Phase II, Year II  Mean 4.17 4.98 
  Median 3.61 4.51 
  Std. Dev. 2.36 2.08 
 Sample days, T 225 29 
    
Phase II, Year III  Mean 2.29 2.22 
  Median 2.09 2.10 
  Std. Dev. 8.24 0.55 
 Sample days, T 230 25 
    
Phase II, Year IV  Mean 1.94 1.65 
  Median 1.59 1.42 
  Std. Dev. 0.97 0.52 
 Sample days, T 75 7 
 
The table shows distribution of liquid and illiquid days on the ECX. The daily relative spread, measure of liquidity is computed using December maturity EUA futures contracts. 
The relative spread is defined as the best traded bid minus the best traded ask price scaled by the average of the best traded bid and ask prices over 15-minute intervals, then 
averaged for each trading day. For every day when the daily relative spread is at least one standard deviation above the mean relative spread for the surrounding period over (-
30, +30), we define the day as illiquid and when it is not, liquid. All spread estimates are multiplied by a factor of 103.The data is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd 
January 2008-29th April 2011. The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. The delineation of the contracts analysed for each year, 
based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 
maturities are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011. 
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Table 5 
Predictive regressions of 15-minute returns on lagged OIB€t and lagged OIB€t interacted with an illiquidity dummy 
 
  Coefficient t-statistic Probability     
Phase II, Year I Intercept -0.09 -0.14 0.89   
t= 13,869 OIB€t-1*ILD 33.40*** 4.05 0.00  
 OIB€t-1 1.62 0.64 0.52  
 R-squared      38.00  
      
Phase II, Year II Intercept -0.07 -0.12 0.91   
t= 18,296 OIB€t-1*ILD  33.10*** 3.80 0.00   
 OIB€t-1   3.08 0.98 0.33  
 R-squared      13.90 
      
Phase II, Year III Intercept 0.20 0.89 0.37   
t= 20,984 OIB€t-1*ILD 4.38 1.12 0.26  
 OIB€t-1 1.23 0.86 0.39  
 R-squared      1.45 
      
Phase II, Year IV Intercept 0.82** 2.31 0.02   
t= 4,840 OIB€t-1*ILD 20.70**  2.23 0.03  
 OIB€t-1 1.91 0.64 0.52  
 R-squared      4.51  
The table shows results for 15-min predictive regressions for EUA Futures contracts on the ECX. OIB€t-1 is given as the Euro value of buyer initiated trades less Euro value 
of seller initiated trades, then divided by the total Euro value of trades over the 15-minute interval, t-1. The Rett, is computed for every 15-minute interval using the last trade at 
every interval is the return at interval, t. The dummy ILD is 1.0 for every day when the daily relative spread is at least one standard deviation above the mean relative spread 
for the surrounding period over (-30, +30) and 0 otherwise. Specifically, the following regression is estimated using least squares with Newey and West (1987) HAC: 
tttt ILDbalanceOrderbalanceOrderret   *ImIm 1211  
All coefficient and R2 values are multiplied by a factor of 104. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The data is for Phase II 
of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The data includes December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. The delineation of the 
contracts analysed for each year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, 
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December 2009, 2010 and 2011 maturities are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used 
for Year 2011. 
 Table 6 
Liquidity and market efficiency dynamics: Granger causality analysis 
 
Panel A. Daily contract-specific (year-dependent) liquidity and market efficiency dynamics 
 
  
Order Imbalance does not cause 
Relative Spread 
Relative Spread does not cause Order 
Imbalance 
Phase II, Year I Dec-2008 Futures 1.48  2.40***  
 Dec-2009 Futures 0.97  2.93*** 
 Dec-2010 Futures 0.78  2.04*  
    
Phase II, Year II Dec-2009 Futures 1.98**  2.63***  
 Dec-2010 Futures 5.24***  2.77***  
 Dec-2011 Futures 1.56  2.88***  
    
Phase II, Year III Dec-2010 Futures 1.06 2.44**  
 Dec-2011 Futures 1.70**  1.71**  
 Dec-2012 Futures 4.69***  2.54**  
    
Phase II, Year IV Dec-2011 Futures 0.19  0.14  
 Dec-2012 Futures 0.30  0.98  
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Panel B. Daily contract-specific liquidity and market efficiency dynamics: Granger causality analysis 
 
 
Order Imbalance does not cause 
Relative Spread 
Relative Spread does not cause Order 
Imbalance 
Dec-2008 Futures 1.48  2.40***  
Dec-2009 Futures 1.50  4.76***  
Dec-2010 Futures 1.68*  4.45***  
Dec-2011 Futures 0.65  3.39***  
Dec-2012 Futures 2.83***  2.26***  
 
The Table shows results for the Granger (1969) causality analysis. A model of the following form: 
tlltlltt
tlltlltt




1111110
1111110
......
......  
is estimated for the likely pairings of (δ, φ) series in the set. δ denotes the daily mean of the 15-minute Euro order imbalance measure, φ is the daily relative spread liquidity 
proxy and l is the lag length. F-statistics in the table are the Wald statistics for the joint hypothesis: 
0...21  l  
for each of the bivariate equations. The null tested is that δ does not Granger-cause φ in the top equation and that φ does not Granger-cause δ in the bottom equation. Panel A 
shows contract-specific (year/period-dependent) results, while Panel B shows contract-specific results with no breaks. ***, ** and * represents statistical significance at 1%, 
5% and 10% levels respectively. The data is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January, 2008-29th April, 2011. The variables are computed from December maturity 
EUA futures contracts traded during the period. The delineation of the contracts analysed for each year, based on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the 
December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 maturities are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 
maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011. 
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Table 7 
Daily variance ratios for EUA futures contracts across trading periods 
 
 Year I Year II Year III Year IV 
Dec-2008 2.18    
Dec-2009 9.47 3.46***   
Dec-2010 16.61 3.13*** 1.08***  
Dec-2011  5.68 1.96*** 1.43* 
Dec-2012   2.44 1.37 ** 
Value weighted overall 3.74 3.22 1.39 1.42 
 
This table shows contract-specific ratio of 15-minute return variance to open-to-close return variance, scaled by the number of 15-minute intervals in a trading day on the ECX. 
The final row in the table is the trading value-weighted aggregate variance ratio per period. Data is as defined as Table 1. ***, ** and * denote values which are significantly 
different from the previous compliance year’s value at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The data used is for Phase II of the EU-ETS, and spans 2nd January, 2008-29th 
April, 2011. The variables are computed from December maturity EUA futures contracts traded during the period. The delineation of the contracts analysed for each year, based 
on trading activity constraints, is as follows: For Year 2008, the December 2008, 2009 and 2010 maturities are used; for Year 2009, December 2009, 2010 and 2011 maturities 
are used; for Year 2010, December 2010, 2011 and 2012 maturities are used and the December 2011 and 2012 maturities are used for Year 2011. 
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